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There  are  many  different  images  of  the  livestock  industry  and many  persons  are  unhappy  with  the  out-
come  of the market  process.  Instead  of  explaining  why  the  market  leads  to  the  current  outcomes,  it  is
wise  to be  prepared  that politics  will  rearrange  the  property  rights  in  order  to produce  different  outcomes
of  the market  mechanism.  In this essay,  I show  that  there  are  market  processes  that  contribute  to  a  more
sustainable  way  of farming,  and  that  these  processes  can  be reinforced.  There  are  also  unsustainable
public  policies  that  can  be  liberalized.  And  where  the  market  fails,  the government  should  intervene,  buteywords:
ustainability
ivestock industry
conomics
olicy
ransition
may  choose  market-oriented  instruments.
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. Introduction
The livestock industry is confronted with contested images. This
s best noted in the informal circuit, such as at birthday parties or in
afés. Some of these stories are about excesses, or alleged excesses,
uch as Q fever, mega stables, manure problems or antibiotics. Oth-
rs focus on the role of businesses, multinationals, the retail sector
nd the exploited peasant. Yet others are images of livestock farms
hat seem to belong to the popular computer game FarmVille, or
he classic Dutch song by Wim  Sonneveld, ‘Our Village’, describing
utcher J. van der Ven in Deurne: ‘I was a child and did not know
etter/than that it never would pass.’
These images are so different that they are a symptom of an
ndustry that is in crisis and seeking a better future. This can be
nferred from the public agenda-setting theory of American politi-
al scientist Frank Baumgartner [1]. He always sees, whatever the
opic of discussion, the same pattern in social change: a crisis is a
risis because the public ﬁnds out (usually as a result of an inci-
ent such as the culling during a swine fever epidemic) that reality
s different from they thought it to be. Stables are larger than
hey thought, animals are kept in a way that they did not know
bout, and the consumption of antibiotics is far greater than they
∗ Economic essays are not without values and contain implicit and explicit opin-
ons. In this case only the author is responsible for them, and they are not the opinion
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2013.05.010realized. In short, the stories between people and between them
and the experts differ.
In such a situation, states Baumgartner, experts–such as
scientists–very often contribute to the confusion. They explain how
the industry technically works, what good historical reasons led
to its development, that we  as an audience have understandably
not followed its development, and that we therefore have to get
used to it and accept the current practice, although some marginal
adjustments to the system are, of course, not ruled out.
Baumgartner indicates that this contribution does not work if
the subject has become one of those ﬁve to seven subjects on the
front page of the New York Times and on the president’s to-do list,
because then it has become a political debate on ethics, values and
norms. History, technology, or revenues and costs no longer matter
that much.
Baumgartner does not offer a real solution for those who  fear the
crisis. At a conference [2] we organized four years ago in Wagenin-
gen on transitions in the domain of agriculture in the metropolitan
landscape, and where Baumgartner acted as keynote speaker, his
advice was ‘be prepared’.
A political debate on the future of the Dutch livestock indus-
try will undoubtedly reﬂect on the role of the government and
the functioning of the markets, because in discussions of inter-
vention through politics, the question always arises what can be
left to the market and where does the government has to act. I
reﬂect on that balance from an economic perspective, in which the
greatest possible prosperity for the whole of society is an important
goal.
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Level Core elements Doel Stable for
Soc ial theory Informal structures: customs, traditions, 
norms, reli gion
Spontaneous 100-1000  
years
Economics of
property
Institutional environment: formal rules 
of the game - especially property 
(judiciary, bureauc racy, policing)
Design institutional 
context
10 – 100 years
Transaction cost 
economics
Governance: play of the game -
espe ciall y organisation al fo rms li ke 
markets, contracts, command and 
control, vertical int egr ation  etc.
Design 
organisations and 
contracts
1 – 10 years
Neo-class ical 
economics, contract
and agency theor y
Resource alloc ation (pr ices,  quant ities,
information, incentive alignment)
Deter mine marg inal 
conditions (prices)
dail y
nomics of institutions.
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POLICY 
MEASURE TYPE
DEFINITION
Mandates Rules governing the actions of individuals and agencies
Inducements Transfer money to individuals in return for certain actions
Capacity building Spending time and money for the purpose of investment in 
material, intellectual or human resources (research, 
speeches, extension, etc.)
System changing Transfer official authority (rather than money) to 
individuals and agencies in order to alter the system by 
which public goods and services are deliveredFigure 1. The eco
Williamson (2000) partly cited from Hazeu (2007) [4].
. Theory
To analyse the interaction between government and markets,
t makes sense to use the theory of institutional economics, which
iscusses institutions such as property rights, and whether any-
hing should be organized through the market or the bureaucracy.
igure 1, which was developed by Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson
3], distinguishes four levels of analysis, each with its own stability.
Williamson’s diagram can most easily be made plausible by
eading it from top to bottom. Social norms inﬂuence our daily
ctions: if the Koran prescribes that interest is not a good idea,
hen there are no mortgages and one has difﬁculties borrowing
oney (contract form) and paying interest (price). If the state has a
onopoly on TV, you cannot set up a commercial TV station and it
s usually not possible to advertise on TV. These are all things that
ffect daily transactions.
But the lower layers also inﬂuence the upper ones, as property
ights and norms are adapted to daily scarcity. If due to techni-
al development, TV channels are no longer scarce this leads to
iberalizing the state monopoly, privatization and commercial TV.
f there is a need for residential mortgages for Muslims, a con-
truction that is tolerable will be sought. As dark nights become
carce, horticultural holdings lose their right to unlimited light-
ng in their glasshouses; neighbours and birdwatchers create an
conomic property right on darkness. The theory of cultural mate-
ialism, which is rooted in a Marxism stream in anthropology,
ven explains many of the standards and symbols and much of
he ideology of a society from the needs of the people. They were
eveloped through trial and error, and if they were bothersome,
hey would not be maintained. Thus, the dietary laws laid down in
he Bible can be interpreted as ancient rules for food safety. The
ssential observation is that such institutions lead lives of their
wn and become rigid–and so it takes time to adjust them again
f needed.
In my  opinion, a crisis (such as those identiﬁed in the public
genda-setting theory) arises if the layers in Williamson’s diagram
o not produce the desired results–it rubs too much. That then
ften demands changes in terms of organization and ownership,
nd sometimes new norms and values. In a crisis or transition, the
hange concerns not so much the way we do business every day,
ut the values, norms and property rights, which are the basics that
ule the system: in a transition, we begin to think differently about
earing fur or about our meat consumption, or animal welfare.
pon closer inspection, we  ﬁnd that we as tourists or residents are
ntitled to an odour-free countryside. Or we believe that farmers
re entitled to a larger share of the value added in the chain. In other
ords, if the problem is with the outcomes at the low level of costs
nd revenues, the solution can often be found at the higher level of
earranging the institutional environment.Figure 2. Different types of policy measures.
This paper deals with the question whether there is a greater
role for the market or for the government to play when property
rights or values shift. Is the market derailed, and should the govern-
ment play a lasting, greater role in the organization of the livestock
industry? Or can the market solve the problems when values and
property rights are rearranged?
The following three sections describe the role of the market and
the government in the development of the Dutch livestock industry.
Based on that analysis, we identify the missing property rights and
the policy measures that could be adopted to get prices right and
let the market do its work.
As there are many types of policy measures–they range from, for
example, tax law to direct subsidies to build new stables–it is use-
ful to classify them into groups. McDonnell and Elmore [11] have
deﬁned a policy measure typology in the following way  (Figure 2):
3. The role of the market
The development of livestock farming since the Second World
War  has mainly been determined by the development of labour
productivity [5]. The increase in wages in the European economy
reﬂects the growth in prosperity. As a result, the demand for meat
and dairy products increased, as did the labour costs of the farmer.
Where a farmer had to cope with a meagre income, that was a sign
for the next generation to vote with their feet and look for work off
the farm. Thus, the number of farms dropped sharply.
The income could be increased by increasing the scale of the
farm, as the manufacturers of machinery and stable equipment
constantly brought new technologies to the market that increased
labour productivity (roughly the amount of products that one man
can produce). Thus, farms became bigger and bigger. Since not
everyone farms with the very latest technology, this development
will continue in the years to come, even if nothing new emerges
from the R&D departments of the machine factories.A second important development in the market was  that of spe-
cialization. Not everyone is equally good at everything. And so it is
wise for one farmer to produce animal feed, and another farmer to
keep the animals. Or one farmer raises piglets and the other farmer
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attens them to slaughter weight. Such a specialization, which is
ossible through trade and transport, also leads to prosperity.
A third important development is that of more intensive land
se: we now produce more per hectare than ever before. This is due
o technological development, so there is now a higher yield of grass
han ever. As the competitiveness of livestock is good, and the space
n this country limited, we import feed and specialize in breed-
ng, milking and fattening. This good competitive position is based
n many factors, and it would be beyond the scope of this essay
o give a complete overview. It certainly has to do with the prox-
mity of afﬂuent consumers, and also with being close to the sea,
hich allows the import of cheap overseas supplies of feed. Besides
anks, slaughterhouses, dairies and many other parties in the agri-
usiness sector, cattle feed manufacturers play an important role,
specially in intensive livestock production.
Stimulated by rising labour costs and the good competitive posi-
ion, which is based on relatively cheap feed, the livestock sector
as managed to expand since the Second World War, through
conomies of scale, specialization and intensiﬁcation. Whenever
uch an expansion was brought to a halt by the government due to
verproduction and environmental problems, the sector was able
o maintain its production level.
. Role of the government
It would be wrong to think that the structure of the industry
s only a result of market forces. The government also played an
mportant role. After the war, it was confronted with the ‘small
easant’ issue. On sandy soils, there was a labour surplus with
elatively high poverty in large families that often lived far from
ork in the city: they were served by dirt roads, and had no tele-
hones, electricity or other utilities. Besides emigration, migration
o the cities and industrialization, intensive livestock farming was
 great solution for the small mixed farms. The government stimu-
ated the development of the industry through the renowned OVO
riptych (research, education and extension), land consolidation, a
oan security fund and various other policies.
With the establishment of the EEC (now the EU), the Common
gricultural Policy (CAP) was also very supportive: imports of ani-
al  feed containing cereal substitutes (initially mainly residues
rom the food industry, such as soybean meal and citrus pulp, and
ater tapioca) were so small in the early 1960s that the European
gricultural policy left them outside the system of import, also not
o offend the American exporters and the importers of palm oil
or margarine production. This led to the chagrin of French cereal
rowers in the shielding of the single European market to the ‘hole
f Rotterdam’, which was also the ‘hole of Cherbourg’. Whereas in
he 1950s a kilo of grain and a kilo of milk cost the same, under the
AP the price of milk soon increased disproportionally. Feeding of
oncentrates and milk production per cow and per hectare went
p.
In the 1970s, the modernization of the livestock industry was
urther stimulated by tax incentives known as WIR  (Investment
ccount Act). This happened at a time when some critics and
ageningen scientists [6] were already seriously questioning the
xpansion and intensiﬁcation. The dairy market was  glutted, as
videnced by the milk lakes and butter mountains, and the envi-
onmental problem on sandy soils became increasingly manifest.
The development of the industry had also led to side effects
hat caused the support of the public and hence the government
o crumble. Other papers in this issue document those negative
ffects, including those that are experienced without scientiﬁc con-
ensus. The current list of the ‘usual suspects’ is long: ammonia
missions and odours, the manure problem, antibiotic use, con-
ributing to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions,of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 33– 37 35
biodiversity issues through deforestation for fodder production,
landscape degradation, animal welfare issues, animal diseases with
some human effects, etc.
In the 1980s, it was  especially the manure policy and (in the EU)
the overproduction that made the government shift from a policy
of expansion to one of consolidation. Brussels did that through the
milk quota, and Minister Gerrit Braks was  able to convince Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers of the necessity of the Interim Act, which
restricted expansion in intensive livestock farming. With hindsight,
many came to ask whether the market failures in the environmen-
tal impacts were not accompanied by government failure in the
late intervention in the manure market. But it was  typical that the
minister of agriculture had to use the necessary persuasion to make
the transition from increasing production to limiting it.
A recent change in the CAP will abolish the milk quota, which
was introduced in the 1980s. The abolition of milk quotas in 2015
will lead to an expansion of the dairy sector [9]. That may be more
durable than it seems: economically less sustainable production
(such as of starch potatoes) will shrink. Because the use of animal
manure in this country is limited, it will also cause the substitution
of dairy cows for pigs, with dairy farms realizing more value added
per unit of environmental impact [10].
5. Interaction between policy and market
Looking back, it is the effective interaction between government
and markets that has determined the development of the industry.
The government chose a policy that had synergy with the actions
in business. The market and the government made the sector a suc-
cess. Precisely such cooperation seems an important prerequisite
for healthy development and competitiveness.
This raises the question whether such cooperation could play
a role in the sustainability of the sector through market-oriented
processes and in this way increase the public’s support. To answer
that question, the following section identiﬁes the property rights
that have to be either strengthened or weakened.
6. Current changes in property rights
The Dutch livestock sector is confronted with changes in
attitudes and norms with respect to animal welfare and meat con-
sumption. These issues are intertwined and make some consumers
leave the market for meat and become vegetarian. The interest in
the issue of climate change is fuelling the discussion on the negative
externalities of the livestock industry and eating meat (Figure 3).
These changes in attitudes and norms have been inﬂuenced by
externalities and new scarcities (like the living environment), but
are partly also much wider than the livestock industry and the local
environment in which it operates (e.g. climate change issues). The
changes in attitudes have already led to a changing political econ-
omy  with a strengthening of property rights that protect the living
environment of citizens. The manure legislation in the 1980s was
only the beginning of this trend. In addition, climate change issues
play a role (e.g. in abolishing a subsidy on diesel fuel), although the
intensive livestock sector also beneﬁts from the thinking on the
greening of the economy, for example in producing biogas from
manure.
Some of the changes in attitudes and norms have led to new
forms of governance, as they were translated not only into prop-
erty rights and government policy, but also into new relationships
between retailers and farmers. In some cases, retailers and farmers
noticed the possibility of consumer segmentation.
Consumers are more diverse than ever and modern technol-
ogy makes them more easily targeted with tailored advertising
and products. Market researchers distinguish a dozen segments
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and agency theory incentive alignment) welfare regulation
Level Core elements Recent changes
Social theory Informal structures: customs, 
traditions, norms, religion
Changes in thinking on keeping livestock 
 (animal welfare)
Changes in thinking on meat consumption 
(vegetarianism) 
Increased attention to climate change  and 
biodiversity
Economics of
property
Institutional environment: 
formal rules of the game –
especially property (judiciary, 
bureaucracy, policing)
Strengthening property rights related to the 
living environment (manure, landscape, 
buildings)
Tightening rules on antibiotics
Regulation on climate change
Transaction cost 
economics
Governance: play of the game 
– especially organizational 
forms like markets, contracts, 
command and control, 
vertical integration, etc.
Retail brands are vulnerable to criticism from 
NGOs, leading to new requirements being 
imposed on producers
Use of labels with sustainability claims for 
segmentation of consumers, incl. organic
Neoclassical 
economics, contract 
Resource allocation (prices, 
quantities, information, 
 Higher costs for manure disposal
Higher costs for buildings due to animal 
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lFigure 3. Potential policy measures for the governmen
f consumers, ranging from postmodern hedonists and the conve-
ience oriented, to new conservatives–classiﬁcations that are often
ased on economic status vs. the values and norms of consumers
r households.
The market share of the most durable consumer niches–such as
rganic or fair trade–is in many cases limited, but there is also a gen-
ral trend in which retailers set the criteria for production through
usiness-to-business certiﬁcation programmes. Food companies
imultaneously try to integrate sustainability into the ‘sourcing’
f their purchases (whether or not assisted through consultation
bout certiﬁcation during round tables), if only to establish them-
elves as leading brands or to avert the risk of being accused of
ocial irresponsibility.
Responding to all those segments and consumer trends is not
asy and also requires investments. The food industry is tradi-
ionally more focused on scale and standard products. It was  not
hat long ago that there were heated discussions about introducing
rganic milk because it would compromise the conventional prod-
ct. And it is only very recently that we started registering local
arm cheese with the European Commission as a PDO/PGI. Here,
here is still a way to go.
All in all, there is now a much greater market orientation than
here was in the late 1980s (when the report ‘Om schone Za-ke-lijk-
eid’ [8] put this on the agenda). Labels are helping because they
rovide the product with information and experience and thereby
egment consumers. Competition between the labels in the market
or information also helps, and where that market of labels becomes
oo burdensome for consumers, there is the supermarket that com-
ines them in in-house brands. The Pure & Fair brand of Albert Heijn
s an example.
By choosing between conventional products and those with a
ustainability label, customers can send incentive signals to farmers
nd steer them via retailers and food processors. Numerous studies
how that there are vast differences between livestock farms in,
or example, feed use, energy use and antibiotics, especially when
hose aspects are not being addressed in incentive systems. In many
ases, an important part of the sustainability problem can be solved
y more professional management [7].
Where the consumers do not help to promote sustainability
irectly through their purchases, there are the NGOs that enforce
ustainability by threating to name and shame retailers or brands
f food manufacturers. The castration issue in the pig sector shows
hat this can be very effective, and thereby reduce the time and
ost of control compared to if this were done through legislation.
his governance practice seems to work quicker than the route via
egislation.ange market outcomes in the Dutch livestock industry.
7. Potential policy actions
In their decision-making about how they produce, producers
focus on their customers and other stakeholders directly involved
with the company, such as their employees and ﬁnanciers, and
sometimes their neighbours. There is no incentive, however, to
properly take into account the effects on third parties such as the
environment, the landscape, nature (or nature lovers) or human
health when it comes to the use of antibiotics. Not only is there no
contractual relationship with those parties, but an altruistic farmer
would have his own competitiveness undermined if it he were to
incur costs that cannot be recouped.
Because the biological processes in agriculture cannot yet be
steered with precision, they lead to a relatively large loss of material
and are thus associated with environmental impacts. The on-going
scaling up (see above) puts margins at farm level under pressure,
and this is a signal that production can be much cheaper on farms
that have newer technology. These two forces ensured that we
ended up in the situation that the livestock sector is one in which, in
comparison to the rest of the chain, many unsustainable, external
effects such as various forms of pollution occur and little is earned.
It also means that if the government wants to take environmental
measures, such as in the climate policy, such measures are rela-
tively inexpensive in the livestock industry. This is also a source of
concern for the livestock sector, which runs the risk that insufﬁcient
income compensation takes place in such actions.
Where the market fails, there is reason for government interven-
tion. Property rights are then strengthened: it is no longer possible
to emit CO2 unpunished or to spread manure, by which means the
government takes over ownership of the climate or clean water.
For interventions in the market, the government has a range of
instruments at its disposal, both command and control instruments
(precise instructions on how to produce) and economic instru-
ments that use the market like in tradable quotas, taxes on pollution
or polluting products, patents on new technology, prizes for tech-
nology breakthroughs, transferable development rights, etc. These
economic instruments are often preferred because they encourage
innovation, and that is an important source of wealth. They work
almost by deﬁnition as goal prescriptions, while command and
control instruments prescribe methods or technology and hardly
encourage innovation.
Considering the current debate on the future of the livestock
industry in the Netherlands, the market outcomes are still not sat-
isfying to all the participants, and perhaps social welfare can be
enhanced by changing the institutional context. Potential policy
measures are identiﬁed in Figure 3.
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The government can support and strengthen the current market
evelopments in various ways. It can use innovation programmes
o promote market orientation, facilitate the process between NGOs
nd businesses, and if necessary increase the legal standards for
he laggards who are not sensitive to market incentives. The gov-
rnment can also increase transparency. Long before the war, the
etherlands led the way by obliging farmers to keep books for
ncome tax purposes, with the additional advantage that farmers
ere also faced on paper with the economic side of their busi-
ess. Obliging farmers to ﬁle a sustainability report on a convenient
ublic website would undoubtedly be seen as an administrative
urden, but it would also increase the transparency in the chain and
rovide facts for the discussion with the public about the future of
ivestock husbandry.
Besides abolishing the milk quota, the CAP could support sus-
ainable development by reducing the protection of intensive
ivestock farming. This protection is based on import tariffs, and
ould be broken down, possibly in the context of a bilateral trade
greement with Mercosur or a transatlantic free trade agreement.
he cost price of chicken and pork is higher in the Netherlands
han in the USA and Brazil [11]. In addition, OECD calculations pre-
ict that in the coming 10 years, the prices of most agricultural
roducts will increase, in contrast to the historical trend, due to
he increased demand from emerging economies. But that does not
pply to pork meat, whose production in, for example, Brazil and
hina will increase signiﬁcantly. More market orientation here is
ssociated with loss of production, employment and income, but
he sustainability effects per euro lost could be surprisingly high.
In the policy regarding feedstuffs, a more liberal approach with
ore room for the market could also contribute to sustainability.
he application of GMOs increases the efﬁciency of production: less
and is needed per kilo of feed and there are fewer greenhouse gas
missions, etc. A permanent ban on the import of GMO-produced
eed (that does not apply to meat or dairy products) is not only difﬁ-
ult to achieve if one assumes a zero tolerance, but in the long term
t would also affect the production here–and that’s a strange way
o promote sustainability in the long term. Besides GMOs, there
s still the ban on meat and bone meal (and earlier on restaurant
aste, known as swill), whereas this is replaced by soy. Revoking
his legislation and channelling such feed to professional compa-
ies with speciﬁc control measures would increase sustainability
ithout signiﬁcantly compromising public health. In relation to
nimal feed, also the biofuel policy has to be mentioned (which is in
tself not very sustainable in most countries), which provides a rel-
tively inexpensive, high-protein animal feed and thus stimulates
roduction.
A policy measure that has recently been questioned is the
educed VAT rate on meat, which can be interpreted as a subsidy
n the consumption of a product that is polluting and that is con-
umed in quantities that long ago exceeded the primary needs for
iving. It is not clear, however, what the behavioural effects in the
limination of such a measure would be, especially in low income
roups.
. Finally
In response to the contested future of the livestock industry,
hich indicates an on-going transition, I discussed in this essay
he interaction between market and policy. My  conclusion is that
he market can contribute much to the sustainability of the live-
tock industry. Businesses can use pressure from consumers and
rom NGOs that promote sustainability. The government can lib-
ralize, modify or abolish policies that have unsustainable effects.
nd where the market fails, the government should not fail too, but
[
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take corrective action. In that case, the government can make use
of market-based instruments.
This conclusion is good news, because the government currently
lacks money and we are looking for economic growth. The advan-
tage of market solutions is not only that the government can remain
small (and also not fail due to e.g. a lack of all necessary informa-
tion from the industry), but above all because the market gives
signals through prices about the products and services we  want
for an optimal wealth. These signals induce innovation. The use
of market-based instruments can also lead to the consumer pay-
ing the full social cost of food, which can be used to compensate
for damage or to pay farmers for their extra efforts. Command and
control measures often leave the bill with the farmer, who  must
take action without receiving compensation.
None of this means that this country’s intensive livestock indus-
try will be the same size in 10 years’ time as it is now. Socially
speaking, welfare can be increased by importing more meat and,
after processing, re-exporting it, instead of producing here for
export. Such decisions, however, do not have to be taken by us: by
using market-based policy instruments as suggested above, there
will naturally arise a new equilibrium with a new level of produc-
tion and imports.
Considering the complex situation, there may  be reasons to take
the bull by the horns in a mega deal between society (government)
and the livestock industry that will provide clarity for the coming
20 years. There are now many interesting niche experiments with
new stables and sustainability labels. A further transition cannot be
executed by changing one policy measure when there are a large
number of them. Moreover, it is obvious that new property rights
will be established on both the consumption and the production
side. This is because our livestock industry has both global and local
environmental and biodiversity impacts, and it would be silly to
take action here on such global effects as CO2 that only result in the
relocation of production abroad, or where our foreign customers
are not willing to pay for measures we  take in the food we export.
For scientists, there is a substantial challenge to help to design
such a policy package and to calculate all effects. For businesses,
there is already a task now to boost transparency, especially about
what one is already doing or still could do in the market. Perhaps
those actions can lead to a situation in which the livestock industry
is ‘prepared’ to be blazoned across the front page of the newspapers
and to appear on the prime minister’s to-do list.
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